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either or survivor," on the death of one of the named parties all of
32
the rights of ownership vest in the survivor. By judicial decision,
it is immaterial that an illusory transfer has taken place as long as
the account has been made in full compliance with the Banking Law.
However, it should be noted that the Law Revision Commission has
recommended the amendment of this statute 3 3 to make the presumption a rebuttable one. Should such an amendment be enacted by the
legislature, this type of savings bank account will in all probability
have the same status as a "totten trust" where the rebuttable presumption was created by decisional law.3 4 Joint accounts also would
be subjected to the right of a surviving spouse who might complain
of their illusory nature.

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES ARISING FROm BANK-DEPOSITOR
RELATIONSHIP

The relation existing between bank and depositor is generally
said to be that of debtor and creditor.' It is contractual in nature 2
and while the relationship is not that of trustee and cestui que trust,3
greater rights and obligations exist than are found in a mere debtor
and creditor relation.4 The New York Court of Appeals has stated
3

2
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The presumption, that the depositor intended that the avails of a savings
bank account in trust form should become the property of the beneficiary on
the depositor's death, is not a true presumption of law but is a mere inference
of fact subject to rebuttal by contrary evidence. In re Herle's Estate, 165
Misc. 46, 300 N. Y. Supp. 103 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
I Shipman v. Bank of the State of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E.
371 (1891) ; Bank of British North America v. Merchants' National Bank of
the City of New York, 91 N. Y. 106 (1883).
2 ... the law implies a contract on the part of the defendant to disburse
the money standing to the plaintiffs' credit only upon their order and in conformity with their directions." Shipman v. Bank of the State of New York,
126 N. Y. 318, 327, 27 N. E. 371, 372 (1891).
3 The Buchanan Farm Oil Company v. Woodman, 1 Hun 639 (N. Y. 1874).
4 "Ordinarily, the relation between a bank and its depositors is that of
debtor and creditor . . . . However, a bank deposit is more than an ordinary
debt, and the depositor's relation to the bank is not identical with that of an
ordinary creditor." Hubbs, J., in Gibraltar Realty Corporation v. Mount Vernon Trust Company, 276 N. Y. 353, 356, 12 N. E. 2d 438, 439 (1938). "The
relation between bank and customer is that of debtor and creditor, with a
superadded obligation on the part of the banker to honour the customer's
cheques if the account is in credit. A cheque drawn by a customer is in point
of law a mandate to the banker to pay the amount according to the tenor of
the cheque." London Joint Stock Bank, Ltd. v. Macmillan, [1918] A. C. 777,
789.
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that in discharging its obligations, the bank's liability is fixed by
rules which are akin to those governing the relation of principal and
agent. 5 "In disbursing the customer's funds, it [the bank] can pay
them only in the usual course of business and in conformity to his
[the depositor's] directions. In debiting his account it is not entitled
to charge any payments except those made at the time when, to the
person whom, and for the amount authorized by him. It receives
the depositor's funds upon the implied condition of disbursing them
according to his order, and upon an accounting is liable for all such
sums deposited as it has paid away without receiving valid direction
therefor." 6 While legal commentators consider the rule axiomatic
that, in the first instance, the drawee bank is not entitled to debit the
depositor's account for money paid on altered and forged instruments, 7 under certain circumstances the liability does fall on the
drawer. Thus, when the depositor draws a check in such manner as
to facilitate alteration by a subsequent holder and such neglect is
found to be the proximate cause of loss to the bank, the drawer was
denied recovery." So also, where the depositor has signed checks in
blank which were thereafter stolen and later filled in, he has been
held liable for the bank's loss in paying out such checks. 9
This high degree of care, the breach of which results in liability,
was first formulated in England well over 100 years ago 10 and continues as a rule " in the United States today despite the enactment
of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and particularly Sections 15 and 124 thereof.12

S

"The relation existing between a bank and its depositor is, in a strict

sense, that of debtor and creditor; but in discharging its obligation as a debtor,

the bank must do so subject to the rules obtaining between principal and
agent." Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 50, 53, 2 N. E. 881 (1885).
6 Ibid.
7 BRITON, HANDOOK OF THE LAW OF Bi.us AND Novzs 592 (1943).
8

Timbel v. Garfield National Bank, 121 App. Div. 870, 106 N. Y. Supp. 497

(1st Dep't 1907).
9 Trust Company of America v. Conklin, 65 Misc. 1, 119 N. Y. Supp. 367
(Sup. Ct. 1909). But cf. Heimberg, Inc. v. Lincoln National Bank, 113
N. J. L. 76, 172 Atl. 528 (1934).
10 Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (1827).
11 See note 44 infra.
12 Section 15 provides:
"Where an incomplete instrument has not been
delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated without authority, be a valid
contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature is
placed thereon before delivery." This is identical with Section 34 of the New
York Negotiable Instruments Law. Section 124 provides: "Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent of all parties liable
thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who has himself made, authorized or assented to the alteration and subsequent endorsers. But where
an instrument has been materially altered and is in the hands of a holder in
due course, not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor." This is identical with Section 205 of the New
York Negotiable Instruments Law.
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The case of Young v. Grote 13 continues as the leading authority
on the subject. There the check was raised without its apparent
validity being altered because the drawer unintentionally left blank
spaces in filling in the amount. In holding the drawer liable for the
loss sustained by the bank, the court said, "We decide here on the
ground that the banker has been misled by want of proper caution
on the part of his customer." 14 In 1918 the principle enunciated in
Young v. Grote was reaffirmed by the House of Lords '5 in so far as
it applied to bank and depositor although prior thereto it had been
held 16 that the rule did not apply as between parties on an ordinary
bill of exchange. 1 7 The common law rule can thus be stated: the
depositor owes a duty of care to his depositary bank in drawing and
handling a check so as to prevent the perpetration of a fraud on such
bank, but no such duty exists as between the maker and a subsequent
holder of a negotiable instrument.18 The basis for the rule is the
contractual nature of the bank-depositor relation to which a subsequent holder is not in privity. In this respect, the rule is in accord
with that applicable to ordinary contracts where a party not in privity
sues for damage resulting from the negligent performance of a contract on which he placed reliance. 19
In New York it has also been held that if a depositor draws a
check in such manner as to facilitate alteration, he will be liable to
the bank for the damage caused by his negligence. In the case of
Timbel v. Garfield National Bank,20 the plaintiff drew a check for
"$900" and left a space in front of. both the word and figure "900"
sufficient to permit another to raise the amount to "$4900" by the
insertion of the word and figure "four". In an action by the depositor against the bank to recover four thousand dollars over and
above the original sum of the check, the court stated: "The textbooks
are quite unanimous in asserting that where a drawer of a check has
prepared his check so negligently that it can be easily altered without
13 See note 10 supra.
14 4 Bing. 253, 260, 130 Eng. Rep. 764, 767 (1827).
1r London Joint Stock Bank, Ltd. v. Macmillan, [1918] A. C. 777.
16 Scholfield v. Earl of Londesborough, [1896] A. C. 514.
17 ..... in the case of a cheque drawn by a customer on his banker there
is a special duty . . . which does not exist in the same fashion in the instance
of the acceptor of a bill of exchange, where the instrument is drawn for circulation among the members of the public generally, and is not a direction to
a designated person to pay out of a balance for which he has to account . . .
London Joint Stock Bank, Ltd. v. Macmillan, [1918] A. C. 777, 815.
Is "The defense of negligence in cases of this sort is ordinarily available
only to the drawee bank, to which alone, it has been said, the depositor owes
a duty of care." City of New York v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N. Y.
64, 70, 184 N. E. 495, 497 (1933).
But
19 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
cf. Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) ;
Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923). In these
latter cases the negligent performance created an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm and lack of privity was held not to be a bar to recovery.
20 See note 8 supra.
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giving the instrument a suspicious appearance and alterations are
afterwards 'made, he can blame no one but himself, and that in such
case he cannot hold the bank liable for the consequences of his own
negligence .... , 21
Although in the Timbel case, 22 the Appellate Division has so
ruled, a square holding to the effect that the depositor is liable to a
bank for drawing his instrument in such a manner as to facilitate
alteration has yet to be handed down by the Court of Appeals. Howthat it would impose
ever, that court has hinted on several occasions
23
such liability should the occasion arise.
As early as 1885, the Court of Appeals, in Crazuford v. West
Side Bank,24 intimated that the leaving of unfilled blanks, or the commission of an affirmative act of negligence facilitating the alteration
of an instrument would render the depositor liable for the damage
caused thereby. In that case the plaintiff left a post-dated check with
an employee with instructions to draw funds for a pay-roll on that
date, but the employee altered the date of the instrument, cashed the
check prior to the original date and absconded with the cash. Although the court placed the loss on the bank because the material
alterations had vitiated the instrument, the court hinted that in instances where there was a finding that negligence on the part of the
depositor led to the alteration of an instrument, a different result
might be attained. 25 The mere fact that an instrument was successfully altered would not necessarily result in liability being imposed
upon the drawer.2 6 Whether the depositor's conduct constituted
neg27
ligence is, in New York, a question of fact for the jury.
Even though the jury finds that the drawer acted negligently in
executing the instrument, he will not be estopped from raising the
defense of the invalidity of the instrument unless his act of negligence
21

Timbel v. Garfield National Bank, 121 App. Div. 870, 872, 106 N. Y.

Supp. 497, 499 (1st Dep't 1907).

See note 21 mipra.
See notes 25, 26, 28 infra.
100 N. Y. 50, 2 N. E. 881 (1885).
"The question of negligence cannot arise unless the depositor has, in
drawing his check, left blanks unfilled or by some affirmative act of negligence
has facilitated the commission of a fraud by those into whose hands the checks
may come." 100 N. Y. 50, 55, 2 N. E. 881, 882 (1885).
26 ".. . while the dram~er of the check may be liable where he draws the
instrument in such an incomplete state as to facilitate or invite fraudulent
alterations, it is not the law that he is bound so to prepare the check that
nobody else can successfully tamper with it." Critten v. Chemical National
Bank, 171 N. Y. 219, 224, 63 N. E. 969, 971 (1902).
27 "The defendant [bank] does not claim that in leaving spaces upon her
check which could be filled in by her husband without exciting suspicion, the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence as matter of law. What it does claim,
and what it contended on the trial, was that it was a question of fact to be determined by the jury, from all the circumstances, whether or not she was
negligent, and that if the jury found she was then the defendant should be
relieved from repaying the amount to her. In this contention we think the
22
23
24
25

1950]

NOTES AND COMMENT

was the proximate cause of the loss. 28

The basis for the imposition

of liability on the part of the drawer is that by his negligence, he 29
is
estopped from raising the defense of the invalidity of the instrument.
Therefore, if the drawee does not rely on, or is not misled by the
negligence of the drawer, so that his negligence is not the proximate
cause of the loss, the principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to alter
the general rule that a drawer is not liable for unauthorized payments
by a drawee bank. In Gutfreund v. East River National Bank 31 the
payee firm was designated by a single name. By the mere insertion
of an initial in front of the name of the firm, the clerk was able to
make the check appear to bear the name of an individual rather than
a firm. While the court was able to find sufficient evidence to justify
a finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, it nevertheless
held that the proximate cause of the loss was the defendant bank's
breach of duty in failing to properly identify the payee. The negligent act of the plaintiff in signing an improperly drawn check was
held not to be the proximate cause of the loss. The court indicated
that where the negligence of the drawer has misled the bank, in spite
of the latter's care, the drawer
8 1 would be estopped from asserting the
invalidity of the instrument.
The problem of breach of duty also arises in cases where the
depositor signs a blank check which is thereafter stolen from him and
filled in by the thief. The risk placed on the bank by such conduct
is particularly onerous. The problem has been considered in New
York in a case 32 where the signed blank checks were locked in the
drawer of a safe from which one was stolen and filled in by a dishonest employee. The depositor was expressly found not negligent.
On the contrary, he was found to have shown reasonable care; but
nevertheless he was held liable to the bank for the amount of the
defendant was correct." Timbel v. Garfield National Bank, 121 App. Div. 870,
873, 106 N. Y. Supp. 497, 500 (1st Dep't 1907).
28 Gutfreund v. East River National Bank, 251 N. Y. 58, 167 N. E. 171

(1929).

29 "The grounds for the decision in Youngq v. Grote ... resolve themselves
into the principle that if the negligence of the depositor is the cause of the
payment by the bank of a forged check he may not set up the invalidity of the
paper which he has induced the bank to act on as genuine." Pound, J., in
Gutfreund v. East River National Bank, 251 N. Y. 58, 63, 167 N. E. 171, 172
(1929).
30 See note 28 supra.
31 "If by their negligence the checks had been made payable to genuine
payees who received the amounts thereof, or if the amount of the checks has
been raised through their carelessness, the case would have been different. The
bank might then rely on the form of the checks and charge the plaintiffs with
an estoppel. If we assume that the bank might rely on the checks as being
genuine in form, still it did not exercise any care to identify the payees.
Gutfreund v. East River National Bank, 251 N. Y. 58, 65, 167 N. E. 171, 173
(1929).
32 Trust Co. of America v. Conklin, 65 Misc. 1, 119 N. Y. Supp. 367 (Sup.
Ct. 1909).
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overdraft. "If the defendant is liable at all, it is because
he owed the
33
bank a duty which he violated by signing in blank."
One might think that the New York courts, to be consistent,
would similarly hold the drawer estopped from asserting the invalidity of a negligently drawn instrument or a signed blank check,
stolen and later filled in by the thief, as against a holder in due course.
However, it has been held 3 4 that the accommodation indorser of a
negotiable instrutment is not liable for his negligence to an innocent
purchaser for value. Likewise, it has been held that where negotiable instruments are signed in blank, stolen and filled in by the thief,
the drawer is not liable to a holder in due course.3 5 These decisions
are predicated on the theory that it would be unjust to require the
drawer to anticipate the intervening criminal act of another. 36 Section 124 37 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law would apply
to the case of an altered instrument and permit a holder in due course
to enforce the instrument according to its original tenor, but not for
the raised amount. Section 15 38 would apply to the case of a signed
blank instrument stolen from its maker. The subsequent holder
would have no claim as against the drawer. In such circumstances,
no liability of the drawer to his bank could arise out of the instrument, for either Section 124 or Section 15 would apply. Liability
can only be predicated on breach of the duty of care owing to the
bank.
This greater duty of care owing from a depositor to a bank arises
as an incident to the rights and duties flowing out of the bankerdepositor relationship.39 A bank has no right to refuse to honor a
3

34 Id. at

3, 119 N. Y. Supp. at 369.
National Exchange Bank of Albany v. Lester, 194 N. Y. 461, 87 N. E.
779 (1909).

35 Holtzman, Cohen & Co. v. Teague, 172 App. Div. 75, 158 N. Y. Supp.
211 (1st Dep't 1916) ; ". . . a third person is under no obligation to honor his
paper. He can take it or not as he pleases, and as a rule such paper is accepted in reliance on the immediate transferrer thereof." Linick v. A. J. Nutting & Co., 140 App. Div. 265, 267, 125 N. Y. Supp. 93, 96 (2d Dep't 1910)
(negligence was not actionable as no duty was shown).
31 "On what theory is the endorser negligent because he places his name on
the paper without first seeing to it that these spaces are so occupied by cross
lines or otherwise as to render forgery less feasible? It can only be on the
theory that he is bound to assume that those to whom he delivers the paper or
into whose hands it may come will be likely to commit a crime if it is comparatively easy to do so. I deny that there is any such presumption in the law.
. . On the contrary, the presumption is that men will do right rather than
wrong." National Exchange Bank v. Lester, 194 N. Y. 461, 472, 87 N. E.
779, 783 (1909).
37 See note 12 supra.
38 See note 12 supra.
39 ". . . this duty is greater than that which the maker of an instrument
owes to subsequent holders for value." Trust Company of America v. Conklin, 65 Misc. 1, 4, 119 N. Y. Supp. 367, 369 (Sup. Ct. 1909) ; "It may be more
reasonably urged that the duty of the drawer of a check to use care in drawing
an instrument is placed upon him by law as an incident to the relation of banker
and depositor." Britton, Negligence in the Law of Bills md Notes, 24 COL.
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check. Since a check is, in legal contemplation, a mandate from the
depositor to the bank to pay according to its tenor, 40 should the bank
wrongfully and wilfully (in the sense of doing it intentionally with
full knowledge of the risk involved) refuse to honor a check, it will
be liable to the depositor for substantial damages. 41 On the other
hand, a purchaser for value has a choice as to whether he should
take or refuse the draft, and can be said to have relied on the credit
of the person from whom he secured the instrument. 42 In addition,
a definite contractual relationship exists between bank and depositor
that cannot
be said to exist between the depositor and the holder for
43
value.

A number of jurisdictions have expressed approval of the New
York view.4 4 Professor Britton, while commenting on the scarcity
of litigation involving this precise question, has stated that in no case
decided under the common law, has the drawee bank's right to recover been 4denied where the drawer was negligent in executing the
instrument. r
However, in Kentucky,4 6 Texas,4a and possibly Oklahoma,48 a
L. REv 695 710 (1924); BEuTmi's BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
1190-1194 (Tth ed. 1948).
4oLondon Joint Stock Bank, Ltd. v. Macmillan, [1918] A. C. 777.
41

LAW

Wildenberger v. Ridgewood National Bank, 230 N. Y. 425, 130 N. E.

600 (1921).

42 "A purchaser of a negotiable instrument can take it or not at his option
and usually to some extent, relies on the responsibility of the last holder. A

bank however, must at its peril, pay out the money deposited if the depositor

directs it to." Trust Company of America v. Conklin, 65 Misc. 1, 4, 119 N. Y.
Supp. 367, 369 (Sup. Ct. 1909) ; "Such parties [purchaser for value] take the
paper relying solely upon the reputed responsibility of their transferrers, and
the other parties to it, and its apparent genuineness, and they therefore deal
in it at their peril." Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 50, 54, 2 N. E.
881, 882 (1885).
43 "The maker of a promissory note holds no such relation to the indorsees
thereof as a customer does to his banker. The relation between banker and
customer is created by their own contract, by which the banker is bound to
honor the customer's drafts . . . and if the negligence of a customer affords
opportunity to a clerk or other person in his employ to add to the terms of a
draft and thereby mislead the banker, the customer may well be held liable to
the banker." Greenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell, 121 Mass. 196, 202 (1877);
5 B. U. L. Rav. 193 (1925).
44 Otis Elevator Co. v. First National Bank, 163 Cal. 31, 124 Pac. 704
(1912); Hardy v. Chesapeake Bank, 51 Md. 562 (1879); see Foutch v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 348, 149 S. W. 2d 76, 77 (1941) ; Fordyce
v. Kosminski, 49 Ark. 40, 44, 3 S. W. 892, 894 (1886); Greenfield Savings
Bank v. Stowell, 121 Mass. 196, 202 (1877).
4 BRIMrON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Bmr.S AND NoTEs 1068 (1943).
41 Commercial Bank of Grayson v. Fraley, 117 Ky. 520, 197 S. W. 951
(1917).
-1 Glasscock v. First National Bank of San Angelo, 114 Tex. 207, 266
S. W. 393 (1924).
4s See First National Bank of Cushing v. Ketchum, 68 Okla. 104, 172 Pac.
81, 83 (1918) (alteration being palpable, plaintiff's negligence was not proximate cause of the loss).
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contrary rule, predicated largely on the enactment of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act, has denied the liability of the depositor
to the bank even where his negligence facilitated alteration of the
instrument. The latter courts primarily base their decisions on the
reasoning that a person cannot ordinarily anticipate the commission
of a crime, and further justify their view by pointing out, that regardless of the common law liability of a drawer, the enactment of
Section 124 49 limits the liability of a drawer of an altered check to
the original tenor of the instrument. By the same token Section 15 50
could be said to be conclusive as to the liability of the drawer on an
undelivered, incomplete instrument.
While these arguments are persuasive it is submitted that the
New York view, wherein the drawer is held liable to the bank for
his negligence in facilitating the perpetration of a fraud, is the more
equitable and reasonable rule. The duty of care placed on the drawer
is slight in comparison to the risk undertaken by the bank. The
former, with little inconvenience or bother, can adequately protect
himself, while the latter, with the greatest diligence possible, in view
of its large volume of business, can only protect itself to a small
degree. The argument that a man should not be expected to anticipate the commission of a crime was concisely answered by Finlay,
L. C. who said, "Everyday experience shows that advantage is taken
of negligence for the purpose of perpetrating frauds. .

.

. Crime is

indeed a very serious matter but everyone knows that crime is not
uncommon." 51

While at first glance, the enactment of Section 124 52 might appear to have limited the drawer's liability to the bank, it is considered
by legal commentators that the section should be limited in its scope
to holders in due course and should not apply to the bank-depositor
relationship. 3 They agree that the cause of action is not on the
check itself, but is based on a breach of duty implied in the contract
of deposit.5 4

It results from the special rights and duties involved

in the banker-depositor relationship.
While the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act does not expressly confer a cause of action on a bank against the depositor,
common law principles continue to apply in the absence of a contrary
provision.5 5 Moreover, the Negotiable Instruments Law specifically
49 See note 12 supra.
50
See note 12 supra.
51
London Joint Stock Bank, Ltd. v. Macmillan, [1918] A. C. 777, 789;
Note, 31 HAzv. L. REv. 779-83.
52 See note 12 supra.
53 BRi-roN, op. cit. supra note 44, at 1073; BEUTi'S BRAIrAN NEGOTIARmn
INSTRUMENTs LAw 1190-1194 (7th ed. 1948) ; see also 23 MIcH. L. REv. 775
(1925).
54 BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 53, at 1192-3.
55 Section 196 provides: "In any case not provided for in this act the rules
of the law merchant shall govern." This is identical with Section 7 of the
New York Negotiable Instruments Law. "The enactment of the N.I.L. has
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recognizes the continued existence of the doctrine of estoppel, 56 and
since estoppel is the basis of the depositor's liability at common law,
the same holds true today.

not destroyed common law and equitable principles merely because they have
not been expressly preserved in the act." BRrrorx, op. cit. supra note 42, at
1073.
66 Section 23 provides: "Where a signature is forged or made without
authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or
to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through
or under such signature, unless the party, against whom it is sought to enforce
such right, is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority."
(Italics supplied.) This is identical with Section 42 of the New York Negotiable Instruments Law.

